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A Multicrop Production Model  of Irrigated
Agriculture, Applied to Water Allocation  Policy
of the Bureau of Reclamation
Michael  R. Moore  and Donald H. Negri
Recipients of irrigation water from the Bureau of Reclamation  (BuRec) face a future of
water  conservation.  By formally modeling  surface water  as a fixed, allocatable  input to
a multioutput  firm, this research captures the institutional  constraints governing water
allocation  and,  simultaneously,  establishes a  cohesive  approach  to  analyzing  the pro-
duction effects of BuRec allocation policy. Econometric  results show that BuRec-served
irrigators'  crop supply and land allocation decisions  are generally  inelastic with respect
to the water constraint. Using the elasticities,  a policy simulation of a  10% reduction in
BuRec water allocation indicates that production response to reduced water supply would
affect the national price of three of ten major crops produced by BuRec-served farms.
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Introduction
To  fulfill  its primary mission,  the U.S.  Bureau  of Reclamation  (BuRec) has  steadfastly promoted  the
development  of irrigated  agriculture  in the American  West-on this, both its clients  and critics  agree.
Since  1902,  the BuRec has constructed an irrigation  infrastructure  of 355  water-storage  reservoirs,  254
diversion dams, and thousands of miles of  transportation canals, pipelines, and tunnels (U.S. Department
of the Interior 1988). Over 150,000 farms in the 17 western states receive BuRec-supplied water annually,
irrigating  roughly  10  million  acres  of cropland with  over  25  million  acre-feet  of water.  The  acreage
constitutes one-fourth of western irrigated land, while the water use constitutes between 40% and 85%  of
the annual flow of several major western river systems.
A variety of political and economic forces  have coalesced to dictate reform  of the BuRec's traditional
water  resource development mission  (Moore; Wahl; Wilkinson). In response to the new policy environ-
ment, the BuRec recently  adopted a water management mission  to replace its development  orientation
(U.S. Department of the Interior  1987). The new management objectives include removing institutional
impediments to  irrigation water conservation-including partial  deregulation  of markets in BuRec-sup-
plied water-and developing procedures for reallocating conserved water to meet urban, recreational, and
freshwater  fishery demands.  Although the mix of market incentives  and mandatory regulations remains
to be decided,  recipients of BuRec irrigation water face a future  of water conservation.
This article analyzes  the effect on agricultural production of BuRec water allocation policy. To accom-
plish this, we develop and analyze a multioutput production model of the irrigated agricultural firm, apply
the model econometrically  using BuRec production  data, and simulate production response to a BuRec
water conservation policy. The next section of the article develops the production model of the irrigated
agricultural firm. Recent research  applied a dual approach to modeling multioutput technologies in which
fixed, allocatable inputs provide a source ofjointness in multioutput decisions (Chambers and Just). Using
this general  approach,  we develop  a multioutput profit  function with  land and  surface water  as  fixed,
allocatable inputs. Econometric  estimates of supply and land allocation equations are then reported using
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data from 458 irrigation districts that receive BuRec-supplied  surface water. Elasticity measures show the
effect  of the water  constraint  on land allocation  decisions.  Finally, we  use  the elasticities  to  simulate
BuRec-wide  production response  to a policy-imposed reduction in BuRec water supply. The theoretical
model, empirical estimation, and policy simulation combine to create a cohesive, rigorous framework for
evaluating the agricultural production impacts of BuRec water-resource  policy.
This research makes three general contributions. First, it develops and estimates a positive, behavioral
model of irrigated production. Previous research established the inefficiency associated with the heavily
regulated system of western water  institutions (Burness and  Quirk  1979,  1980; Howe,  Schurmeier,  and
Shaw;  Kanazawa;  Wahl). The  regulations imply that  surface water is an "institutionally-fixed"  input to
the producer. As such, researchers commonly adopted a normative programming approach to analysis of
irrigated production (e.g.,  Bernardo et al.). In contrast, by modeling  surface water as a fixed, allocatable
input to a multioutput firm, this article rigorously incorporates institutional restrictions into a behavioral
model.
Second,  the  article  demonstrates  an  application  of an  important theoretical  model  of multioutput
production in which fixed, allocatable inputs provide a source ofjointness. This model was used several
times, but not commonly, in the 1980s (Chambers and Just; Just, Zilberman, and Hochman;  Moschini;
Shumway, Pope, and Nash). Using the model, explicit allocation equations are derived for the fixed inputs
based on a flexible functional form for the crop-specific profit functions. Previously, the allocation equa-
tions were stated only in general terms (Beattie and Taylor, p. 208; Shumway, Pope, and Nash, p. 76).
Third, the formal model  and empirical application  link irrigated production directly to BuRec water
allocation  policy. By  modeling water  supply  as an exogenous  variable,  BuRec water  allocation  can be
analyzed quantitatively as a public policy variable. The econometric application  creates a geographically
complete set of  results by covering BuRec activity in the entire western United States. The policy simulation
then uses the econometric results to quantitatively  analyze the effect on agricultural production of BuRec
water  conservation  policy.  The  simulation  shows that,  through the production  impacts,  BuRec policy
decisions can influence the market price of some commodities. The potential for price changes raises the
issue of whether BuRec water allocation decisions should be considered solely in terms of federal water
policy or broadened  to include  considerations  of national  agricultural policy.  The  latter  certainly  are
appropriate if, by affecting  market prices, BuRec water-resource  decisions create  welfare effects in com-
modity markets.
A Multioutput Model of the Irrigated Agricultural Firm
While multioutput models of agricultural firms frequently assume that land is fixed at the enterprise level
but allocatable  among crop production  activities, modeling surface water as  a fixed, allocatable input is
novel in a behavioral model. The rationale for modeling surface water as a fixed input originates in the
allocation procedures governing western surface water in general and water deliveries from the BuRec in
particular.
An entire body of economic research concludes that water markets or water-right markets generally do
not guide western  surface water allocation (Bain,  Caves,  and Margolis;  Burness and Quirk  1979,  1980;
Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw; Howitt, Mann, and Vaux). Instead, quantity-based permit systems, typically
administered by the states according to the prior appropriation  doctrine, establish legal rights to surface
water.  Once  established,  legal  procedures,  legislated  policies,  and  administrative  rules  greatly impede
voluntary  transfer of the rights. The  surface water right usually becomes attached to the land on which
the water is applied initially, with surface water rents reflected implicitly in land prices rather than explicitly
in water prices.
Federal  reclamation  law  and  BuRec  practices  exacerbate  the  rigidities  of the  states'  surface  water
administrative  systems  (Ellis and DuMars; Hartman and  Seastone; Wahl).  The BuRec offers  wholesale
water  supply to irrigation  districts from its water  projects in each  of the  17 western states.'  Long-term
contracts,  generally  of 40-year  duration,  establish  terms  of the  delivery  agreement  with  the  districts.
Although the contracts  set water-delivery  charges  to repay a portion of federal expenditures, the charges
reflect administered prices rather than  market prices.2 The combination  of contractual  quantities  and
administratively-set prices  precludes producers from purchasing the quantity of water demanded at the
prevailing price. Further, transfer restrictions  on reclamation water rights are especially  arduous because
the BuRec retains ownership  to many of the original water  rights and federal  reclamation law restricts
water use  to the original  service  area of an irrigation  district  (Ellis and DuMars;  Wahl). To model this
institutional  environment,  annual  surface  water  deliveries  to  farms  in an  irrigation  district  should  be
treated as a fixed,  allocatable input rather than a variable input.3
Similarly, land should be modeled as a fixed, allocatable input to farms irrigating with surface water in
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an intermediate-run production  period. These farms generally  require both off-farm and on-farm  water
delivery systems that represent largely fixed and sunk capital costs (Bain, Caves, and Margolis). Marginal
increases in the land constraint  are expensive, while marginal  decreases have little salvage value. Thus,
land that can be irrigated with existing irrigation  infrastructure is the appropriate  intermediate-run land
constraint.
General  Model
This  section  develops  estimable  crop  supply,  land  allocation,  and  water  allocation  equations  from  a
multioutput specification of irrigated agricultural production. Three assumptions guide the representation
of multioutput  production  (Just,  Zilberman,  and  Hochman):  (a) inputs  are  allocated  to  specific  crop
production  activities;  (b)  production  is technically  nonjoint  so  that  the  allocation  of inputs  uniquely
determines crop-specific output levels; and (c) land and, in this article, surface water, are fixed, allocatable
inputs. Assumptions  (a) and  (b) enable  formation of separate  restricted  profit  functions  for each  crop,
taking land and  water allocations  as given.  Assumption (c)  then provides the source of jointness when
maximizing multicrop profits (Shumway, Pope, and Nash). These assumptions have two desirable features:
they model  the  essential  features  of agricultural  production,  yet  provide  a  tractable  approach  to  the
multioutput enterprise.4
The notation used throughout this article is: p' (pi p  ...  p')  is a vector of strictly positive crop prices
for the m crops; p (pI P2 ...  pm) is a vector of relative crop prices normalized by p'  (with p,, =  1);  r' (r'
r  ...  r')  is a vector of strictly positive variable input prices  for the t inputs; r (r, r2 ...  rt)  is a vector  of
relative variable input prices normalized by p'; y (yi y2 ...  Ym)  is a vector of crop outputs;  W is the fixed
quantity of water; w (w, w2 ...  wi)  is a vector of water allocations to production of crop i; N is the fixed
quantity of land; n (n 1n2 ...  nm) is a vector of land allocations to production of crop i; 2ri(p,  r', wi, ni) is
the restricted  profit function of crop i, which holds water and land allocations fixed;  and n(p', r', W, N)
is the multicrop profit function.
With  competitive  markets  (except for  surface  water) and  regular,  nonjoint technologies,  individual
producers  choose  the profit-maximizing allocations  of surface water and land subject  to the water  and
land constraints. Formally, the multicrop profit function results from maximizing the sum of crop-specific
restricted  profit functions  subject to the constraints:
m  m  m  \
(1)  l(p', r', W,  N) =  Max  i(p', r', w,,  n,):  = Wand  ni  = N  .
W,  ...,  i=  =1  i=
nl,...,  nm
The 7ri(p,  r', wi,  ni)'s are convex and linear homogeneous in p' and r', nondecreasing in pi, nonincreasing
in r', and nondecreasing in wi and n, (Lau  1976). The properties of II(p', r', W, N) follow as convex and
linear homogeneous  in p'  and r',  nondecreasing in p',  nonincreasing  in r', and nondecreasing  in  W and
N (Chambers and Just). A Lagrangian function, denoted L, states the constrained maximization problem as
m  m  m
(2)  L =  7ri(p,(  r', wi,  ni)  +  X(W-  ;w,)  + g(N - ),
i=l  i=l  i=l
where X  and A  are the shadow prices on the surface water and land constraints, respectively. The necessary
conditions for an interior  solution are
(3)  dL/dw,  =  r  i = 1, ..  .,  m,
(4)  dL/dni = dri//dni - °L  =  1, .i  . .,  m,
m  m
(5)  W-  w  =O  and  N-  ni=O.
i=l  i=l
Equations (3) and (4) allocate surface water and land among crops to equate the marginal profit from each
crop. The input constraints in (5)  are binding assuming an interior solution.
Solving  equations  (3)-(5)  yields the optimal solutions  to equation  (2),  denoted  w*(p',  r',  W, N) and
n*(p', r', W,  N).  These represent the multioutput firm's production  equilibrium  in water and land allo-
cations.
Inserting the w* and  n* into the necessary conditions creates a set of identities for comparative static
analysis.  The analysis  does not yield testable  hypotheses about  the constraints' roles  in land and water
allocation. The signs of dw*/O W, dn*/ W,  dw*/dN,  and dn*/dN (i = 1,  ... ,  m) are indeterminate.
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The input constraints' roles in the comparative static results relate directly to the plausible signs on the
constraints'  estimated  coefficients in  the empirical section.  We elaborate  further on  the results for this
reason. The  two-crop case  clarifies  the reasons for the ambiguity of the results and illustrates  the rela-
tionships underlying land and water allocation decisions. Selected comparative static results for a change
in the water constraint are:
dn*  (0d21 rl 20r2  d2 r2d021rl  //  >'
(  W  aW  k  2  aw 2an2 a  w2 0  w H nl / <
d)n*  d_2r2  a  d2r,  d2rl  02r2  /H  >
dW  dw 22  dwldn  d'aw 2d W n 2J/ 
<
(8)  w  (0_11-2w0  d272d2r21  a2r2d2r  2  d 27,  2  (,  a  222  ))  2  H  /  '
(8
) +  H<9wj  QwQn  n  0/
8)  W  \kw 2 n2 + nw2  n2a  n2  n  wl  n,  w20n2 w2 n2
<
and
aw*  a  27r,  2r  +  27rr2  2r,  _  r2  27 r /  / H>
dW  a\wW 2 an r 2 aw  2 dn22  dWldnl, dw2n2  dwdnl/ 
<
where  H is the  determinant  of the  six-by-six bordered  Hessian  for the two-crop  case.5 The  sufficient
conditions dictate only that  I 2 r/w  +  27r2 /  < 0,  2 r/0n  +  r 2
2/0n2  < 0, and H  > 0.  The second
derivatives (drldw, d2 2/w,  dl/dni, and a 2/dn2)  may be positive,  negative,  nga  , or zero since obtaining
a solution to equation  (1) does not require concavity of the restricted profit functions  in the allocatable
fixed  inputs.6 Instead  of concavity,  the  input constraints  ensure  existence  of a  solution by  providing
additional  restrictions  on the optimization problem.  The indeterminacy  of (6)-(9)  generalizes  to more
than two crops.
The results in (6)-(9) illustrate the complexity of decisions  facing a firm with multiple outputs and two
fixed, allocatable inputs. By implication, intuitive approaches to understanding the multioutput agricultural
firm may prove  misleading.  For example,  intuition  suggests that  a firm  facing a  relatively tight water
constraint would allocate  more land to  cotton production (which  has low water  requirements)  and less
land to rice production  (which has high water requirements). The comparative static results show a more
complex set of tradeoffs.
Examining two identities based on the input constraints provides additional insight into the comparative
statics and, again,  links the theoretical  and empirical sections. The identities, formed by substituting w*
for wi and n* for ni in the constraints in equation (5),  impose physical conservation laws on the allocation
decisions. Differentiating  the identities with respect to the water constraint yields
(10)  [  [dn*/0W]  0  and  S  [w*/Wa  1.
The first identity in (10) says that crop-specific land reallocations following a change in the water constraint
sum to zero since land availability remains unchanged. Thus, if producers increase acreage of some crops
in response  to a relaxed water  constraint,  the increases  must be offset with  a reduction  in other  crops.7
The  second identity  in  (10)  says that  water  reallocations  completely  absorb  an increase  in the water
constraint. The only theoretical restriction on the water reallocations is that they sum to 1. Note that the
two-crop case illustrates these  identities: equations  (6)  and (7)  sum to 0,  and (8) and (9)  sum to  1.
Normalized Quadratic  Functional  Form
Unlike conventional input demand functions, fixed-input allocation equations cannot be obtained directly
using Hotelling's lemma. Instead, they must be derived from the necessary conditions for multicrop profit
maximization.  We posit that the restricted  profit functions in equation (1) take a normalized quadratic
form (Lau 1978;  Shumway).  Closed-form  expressions for w* and  n* are  tractable  using the normalized
quadratic  because its first derivatives  are linear.  The allocation  equations,  now denoted  w*(p,  r,  W,  N)
and n*(p, r,  W, N), depend on relative prices since the normalized quadratic imposes linear homogeneity
on the profit function by specifying profit and prices relative to a numeraire price.
To begin deriving the allocation equations,  the necessary  conditions for multicrop  profit maximization
corresponding  to  equations (3)-(5)  form a  system  of (2m +  2) linear  equations.  Setting the equations
corresponding  to  (3)  sequentially  equal  to  7rl/80w,  removes  X, and  doing  likewise  with  the equations
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corresponding to (4) removes  g,.  The resulting equations  form a linear system of 2m equations  with 2m
unknowns,  wi and ni (i =  1, ... ,  m).  From this system,  closed-form  expressions for w*(p,  r,  W,  N) and
n*(p,  r,  W,  N) are derived.  The solutions are the estimable allocation equations:
m  t




(12)  *(p, r, W, N) = f  +  i  ifpf/  +  fikk  +  + fN,  i=  1, ... ,  m,
f=l  k=l
where the as and fs are simplified coefficients from the parameters of the restricted profit functions. The
comparative  static relations aw*/aW, dwI*/N, an*/  W,  and an*/ON, represented by the coefficients on W
and N, cannot be signed even with the specific functional form.8
With the fixed  inputs  set  at optimal  allocations,  applying  Hotelling's  lemma  to the multicrop  profit
function yields  crop supply equations.  First, state  the multicrop  profit function in equation (1) as
m
(13)  n(p', r',  W, N) =  ri(p', r', w*(p',  r', W, N), n*(p', r', W, N)).
The crop supply functions follow directly by using Hotelling's lemma and the envelope theorem (Chambers
and Just):
Ar,(pI,  r', w*,  M2*) (14)  i(p-- -,  - = yi(p,  r', w*,  n*),  i = 1, ... , m.
op,
Corresponding to  (14),  the  supply  equations  derived  from the normalized  quadratic  specifications  are
linear  in p,, r, w*, and  n*.  Substituting  into  the  equations  the  expressions  for  w*(p, r,  W, N)  and
n*(p, r, W, N) from equations  (11)  and (12) results in linear,  reduced-form supply  equations:9
m  t
(15)  y,(p, r,  W, N)  =  yo  +  l 
+ 'Ykrk  +  7  i W  +  yiN,  i = 1, ... ,  m,
f=l  k=l
where the  ys represent  the simplified coefficients after the substitution. The crop supply  functions slope
upward in their own price because restricted profit functions  are convex in p,. However,  the signs of the
coefficients on  W and N (y7 and 74)  again are  indeterminate  because,  in the comparative  static results,
the qualitative  effects of W and N on w*  and n* are indeterminate.
Compared to multicrop  production economics with variable  inputs, the basic difference  in the supply
and allocation  equations  is the presence  of input constraints as  explanatory variables  rather than input
prices.
Empirical Application
Land allocation equations [equation (12)] are estimated on a regional basis for ten crops, including irrigated
corn, wheat,  barley, sugar beets, hay (including alfalfa), pasture,  fruit and nut orchards, rice, vegetables,
and cotton. Irrigated  acreage in these  crops constitutes  85% of harvested  BuRec land in  1987. Regional
supply  functions  [equation  (15)]  are  estimated  for eight of the ten crops, with  orchards and vegetables
excluded  because  the  output  units  for  various  orchard  and  vegetable  crops  are  incompatible.  Water
allocation equations  are not estimated because the data do not include  crop-specific water allocations. 10
Data and Variables
The Bureau of Reclamation operates  120 water projects in the  17 western states, delivering water to 620
irrigation districts. Data on crop output, land allocation, total land in irrigation rotation, water deliveries,
and number of full- and part-time farms are from irrigation district reports filed annually with the BuRec
beginning in  1979. These reports aggregate the values from all farms served by the district. Pooling cross-
sectional data for 458 of the districts with time series from  1979 to 1987 generates  3,507 observations.
The appendix describes  in detail the sample and variable construction.
BuRec operations  are divided into six regions along watershed boundaries  of the major western river
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systems:  Pacific Northwest,  Mid-Pacific,  Lower  Colorado,  Upper  Colorado,  Southwest,  and  Missouri
Basin (U.S. Department  of the Interior  1988). The model is estimated for each region separately because
exploratory analysis indicated that slope coefficients vary substantially across  regions.
The land constraint measures acreage to which irrigation water could be applied with existing irrigation
infrastructure. The water constraint measures all water delivered by an irrigation district to farms, including
BuRec project water  and other  district water  supply  sources.  District water  deliveries  approximate  the
district's legal  entitlement to surface water.
District-level  values for land allocation and crop output summarize individual production decisions  of
all  farms served  by the district.  Substantial variation in the number and  size  of farms  across districts
required  weighting  large districts more heavily  since they represented  more acreage  and generally more
production decisions than small districts. To address variation in district size, we constructed observations
on a per-farm  basis and weighted the observation  by the number of farms in the district. Thus,  district
values  for land allocation,  output, and land and water constraints  are divided by the number of farms.
The average values  are unbiased estimates of the corresponding  farm-level values.
State-specific  agricultural output and input prices are merged with the irrigation district data. We used
expected output prices because producers make land allocation decisions prior to the realization of output
price.  Input  prices  include  current  year  market  prices for  farm  labor,  electricity,  and  gasoline.  Linear
homogeneity of the profit function is imposed by normalizing  all prices by the wheat price.
Other independent variables include climate and soil characteristics corresponding to physical conditions
in the counties in which the irrigation  district operates.  Like output prices,  the climate variables  reflect
expected weather conditions. They include proxies for the amount of energy (average growing degree days)
and rainfall (average effective rainfall) available for plant growth during the growing season. Soil variables
include average soil texture,  soil productivity,  and soil slope for all cropland in the counties.
Finally,  a dummy variable for  1983  captures the effect of 1983's federal payment-in-kind  program on
crop supply and land allocation. A variable measuring the share of district land farmed by full-time farms
serves  as a proxy for management  intensity within the district.
Econometric Issues
To estimate the supply and land allocation  equations,  a disturbance term is appended to each equation.
The properties of the disturbance terms prescribe the appropriate econometric technique for efficient and
consistent  estimation.  Censored  data,  aggregation,  pooled time-series  and cross-sectional  observations,
and joint production raise four econometric issues,  not all of which can be resolved with current econ-
ometric techniques.
The first econometric issue concerns censored dependent variables, as every irrigation district does not
grow  all the crops  produced  in the region.  For example,  corn  output and  land allocation  assume  zero
values for 479 of the 946 observations  in the Pacific Northwest. Applying ordinary least squares to non-
zero observations  leads to biased and inconsistent estimates and eliminates information that can explain
the decision to grow a crop. We estimate  each supply and land allocation equation separately using tobit
regression analysis.  Tobit uses all observations and produces unbiased and asymptotically  efficient esti-
mates with censored data.
The  second  econometric  issue concerns  aggregation.  While  the model  is derived  at the  farm  level,
estimation is based on  data aggregated  to the  district level.  Aggregation  of farm-level  data  can lead to
heteroskedasticity when the number or size of farms varies across districts. Unlike the linear model, tobit
estimates are  inconsistent in the presence  of heteroskedastic  errors  (Maddala). We  assume the source of
heteroskedasticity  is the  number of farms,  which  is the  denominator in the  per-farm  values  for land
allocation,  supply, and the land and water constraints.  Districts with a large number of farms have smaller
error variances than districts with fewer farms. To address the issue, the tobit estimators are weighted by
the number of farms operating in the district.1
The third issue concerns pooling of time-series and cross-sectional data.  Pooling raises the question of
whether the error covariance  matrix satisfies the classical  regression assumptions. The observations may
be  cross-sectionally  correlated,  heteroskedastic,  and/or  time-wise  autoregressive.  Inefficient  estimation
and  potential bias  from other sources  of heteroskedasticity  are ignored  in favor  of eliminating the bias
associated  with censored data.
The  fourth econometric  issue concerns  correlation  of disturbance  terms across equations.  With allo-
catable  inputs  imposing joint  production,  error  terms  are  certain  to  be contemporaneously  correlated
across crops. Efficiency requires simultaneous estimation of a system of equations. However, in the general
linear model,  seemingly unrelated regression does not produce more efficient estimates when the explan-
atory variables are identical  for all equations, as is the case  here. Moreover,  estimating tobit regressions
using a system framework  is computationally  intractable.
34  July 1992Irrigated  Production and  Reclamation Water Policy  35
Results
As many as ten land allocation equations  and eight supply equations are estimated for each of the BuRec
production  regions  using  SHAZAM  (White).  Since  this  article  primarily  focuses  on  the  surface water
constraint's role  in explaining  production decisions,  complete  results are presented  for only three crops
in one  region.  Hay crops,  barley, and  sugar beets in the Pacific  Northwest Region  are  representative  of
the performance  of the estimation  and the role played by the entire set of variables  (table  1).12
Note first that, for an individual crop, parameter estimates generally are similar in sign and significance
for the supply and land allocation equations.  This holds true for crops and regions not reported here.  The
similarity  across  equations  is  not surprising  given  the importance  of land inputs  in  determining  crop
output.
The price variables perform  ineffectively,  on balance (table  1).  Many price  coefficients are statistically
significant.  Nevertheless,  with  few exceptions,  crop supply  equations  do not slope  upward in their  own
prices and cross-price  effects do not appear to be symmetric. Two  factors explain  the ineffective  perfor-
mance. First, severe multicollinearity  among the  11  possible output and input prices seriously hampered
efficient estimation of the coefficients.  Second, output prices lagged one year may not adequately capture
either the complexity of economic  forces  affecting  land allocation  or the lag structure  of prices  on pro-
duction.  Despite the performance of the price variables, the article's primary empirical interest resides in
quantifying the effect of the water constraint on multicrop production. The estimation procedures preserve
the unbiasedness and efficiency of the water constraint coefficients since output prices have little correlation
with water  supply.
Location-specific  physical  variables  function  differently  in a multicrop  model with  fixed,  allocatable
inputs because  crops  compete for  the fixed  inputs.  The  physical variables  in the equations  measure  a
location's comparative  advantage in producing a crop rather than its absolute advantage.  For instance, a
positive coefficient  on low productivity  soil in  the barley land allocation equation  (table 1) implies that
low productivity  soil increases acreage allocated to barley because barley is a relatively profitable  use of
marginal land. It does not imply that low productivity  soil will have greater barley production than high
productivity  soil.
Within this framework,  the climate  and soil coefficients are generally  statistically significant and con-
sistent  with  an agronomic  approach.  The  performance  of the variable  "annual  growing  degree  days"
(GDD) in the land allocation  equations  in the Pacific Northwest Region illustrates this.  GDD measures
the expected length and energy intensity of the growing season.  The coefficients on GDD are significant
at the  .01  level for eight of the nine land allocation equations (including two of the three crops presented
in table  1).  The  signs  correspond  closely  to  the length of growing  season  required by  the crops.  Land
allocated  to  fruit and nut orchards,  sugar beets,  grain corn,  and vegetables  (predominantly potatoes  in
this region) increases with GDD. These four crops require relatively long growing seasons of four to seven
months  (Hagan, Haise, and Edminster; Jensen).  Coefficients  on GDD are negative for wheat, hay crops,
pasture,  and fallow land allocations.  In the Pacific Northwest,  spring wheat has a growing season  of less
than  four months  during the relatively  cool  months of early  spring to early  summer (Bernardo  et al.),
while hay  crops and pasture  do not require  a long season  because  they are  cut  or grazed periodically
within the season rather than reaching a single mature stage at season's end (Hagan, Haise, and Edminster).
Fallow land naturally requires no growing season.  Finally, the GDD coefficient  for barley land allocation
is not significantly different from zero. Within the Pacific Northwest Region, barley land allocation choices
are insensitive to GDD. The general consistency of  the physical variables with an agronomic interpretation
of the results lends credibility to the data and the analysis.
The input constraints distinguish this model from traditional agricultural production models that include
water and land as variable inputs. The constraints perform strongly as determinants of irrigated production
decisions.  For example,  the land constraint is significant at the  .01  level in eight of nine land allocation
equations  and all six supply equations that are estimated with data  from the Pacific Northwest  Region.
Of the nine land allocation equations,  the surface water constraint is significant at the .05  level in seven
equations  and at the  .01  level in four of those  seven.  Of the six crop supply equations, it is significant  at
the .10 level in five equations and at the  .01  level or better in four of those five.
Coefficients  on  the  land constraint  in  the land  allocation  equations  measure  the  change  in  acreage
allocated to a crop given a one-acre increase in total land.' 3 For example, an additional acre of land would
increase allocations  to hay crops,  barley, and sugar beets by .172,  .173, and .087 acres, respectively (table
1).  The physical identity [equation  (10)]  requires that, when all crops  are accounted for, changes in land
allocation  sum to  one  for a  change  in the land  constraint.  In the  Pacific  Northwest  Region,  the  land
constraint  coefficients from the nine land allocation  equations  sum to .815.  The difference  between the
identity summing to one and the coefficients summing to .815 can be attributed to land allocations made
to relatively  minor crops, which are not estimated.
Coefficients  on  the  water  constraint  in the  land allocation  equations  measure  the change  in acreage
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Table 1.  Tobit Model Estimates-Three Irrigated Crops in Pacific Northwest  Region
Alfalfa Hay
and Other Hay  Barley  Sugar Beets
Crop  Land  Crop  Land  Crop  Land
Independent  Supply  Allocation  Supply  Allocation  Supply  Allocation
Variables  (tons)  (acres)  (bu.)  (acres)  (tons)  (acres)
Prices:
Hay  0.91  0.170  -23.16  -0.248  -38.89  -1.758
($/ton/W)a  (1.4)  (1.2)  (-2.2)  (-2.0)  (-10.4)  (-10.2)
Barley  -60.83  -14.645  1,557.10  18.325  507.26  27.431
($/bu./W)  (-1.3)  (-1.5)  (2.1)  (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.5)
Corn  12.17  11.163  -837.47  -9.527  290.55  11.483
($/bu./W)  (0.5)  (1.9)  (-1.9)  (-1.8)  (2.0)  (1.7)
Fruit Index  -0.05  0.003  1.26  0.017  1.15  0.055
(index/W)  (-0.7)  (0.2)  (1.0)  (1.1)  (3.4)  (3.4)
Sugar  Beets  -2.71  -1.319  89.13  1.061  -6.30  -0.322
($/ton/W)  (-1.4)  (-3.0)  (2.9)  (2.9)  (-0.9)  (-0.9)
Vegetable  Index  -1.66  -0.614  42.78  0.499  -14.00  -0.596
(index/W)  (-2.0)  (-3.4)  (3.2)  (3.2)  (-4.0)  (-3.7)
Wage  Rate  -3.82  0.145  -173.91  -1.878  -122.75  -5.818
($/hour/W)  (-0.4)  (0.06)  (-1.0)  (-0.9)  (-2.8)  (-2.8)
Electricity  38.45  10.788  -725.04  -8.869  511.97  22.467
(¢/kwh/W)  (2.8)  (3.5)  (-3.2)  (3.3)  (7.9)  (7.4)
Gasoline  -2.30  -1.552  646.51  5.969  490.84  22.259
($/gal./W)  (-0.04)  (-0.1)  (0.6)  (0.5)  (1.6)  (1.6)
Fixed Quantities:
Surface  Water  0.19  0.035  -2.66  -0.031  -0.19  -0.010
(acre-feet)  (12.6)  (10.5)  (-11.2)  (-10.8)  (-3.0)  (-3.3)
Irrigated Land  0.77  0.172  15.30  0.173  1.75  0.087
(acres)  (14.0)  (14.0)  (16.9)  (16.1)  (6.9)  (7.4)
Physical Variables:
Growing  Deg. Days  -0.01  -0.004  0.06  0.001  0.10  0.004
(days)  (-2.3)  (-3.4)  (0.7)  (1.2)  (4.4)  (3.7)
Effective  Rain  -3.17  1.440  427.49  5.795  16.43  0.521
(inches)  (-0.7)  (1.5)  (5.8)  (6.6)  (0.9)  (0.6)
High Prod. Soil  -1.24  -0.130  114.00  0.690  53.51  2.587
(dummy var.)  (-0.4)  (-0.2)  (2.2)  (1.1)  (5.3)  (5.5)
Low Prod. Soil  -16.97  -0.618  335.66  4.303  1.11  0.394
(dummy var.)  (-3.8)  (-0.6)  (4.6)  (4.9)  (0.05)  (0.4)
Sandy Soil  -1.58  2.168  -558.51  -8.020  b
(dummy var.)  (-0.2)  (1.2)  (-4.0)  (-4.8)
Clayey Soil  -11.74  2.713  -99.55  -2.415  386.37  19.001
(dummy var.)  (-2.6)  (2.7)  (-1.3)  (-2.7)  (6.7)  (7.0)
Soil  Slope  1.72  0.064  -78.76  -1.024  -10.23  -0.510
(%  slope)  (3.1)  (0.5)  (-8.0)  (-8.7)  (-3.5)  (-3.7)
Other:
PIK  -5.33  -2.078  106.72  1.077  39.54  1.804
(dummy var.)  (-1.3)  (-2.3)  (1.6)  (1.4)  (2.1)  (2.1)
Full-time Acres  -53.14  -11.226  172.77  2.061  268.67  12.508
(%  of acres)  (-8.9)  (-8.4)  (1.8)  (1.8)  (7.2)  (7.2)
Intercept  107.68  23.742  -2,140.40  -25.088  -829.98  -40.740
(3.5)  (3.4)  (-4.3)  (-4.2)  (-5.7)  (-6.0)
Standard Error of  28.22  6.290  441.46  5.268  77.53  3.604
the Estimate
Note: The table reports estimated regression coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics. Maddala (pp. 151-56) describes
the relationship between regression coefficients and normalized coefficients in the tobit model. SHAZAM reports both.
a W denotes the wheat price  ($/bu.), which serves as numeraire.
b No estimate  is provided because  sandy soil was omitted from the regression  to facilitate convergence.
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Table 2.  Land Allocation  Elasticities with Respect  to Water Constraint
Bureau of Reclamation Production  Region
Pacific  Lower  Upper  Missouri
Irrigated Crop  Northwest  Mid-Pacific  Colorado  Colorado  Southwest  Basin
Alfalfa &  Hays  0.58  0.07  0.70  -0.18  0.27  -0.09
(10.5)a  (2.4)  (8.2)  (-8.1)  (2.1)  (-2.7)
Barley  -1.08  -0.43  -0.05  0.19  -0.41  0.15
(-10.8)  (-7.9)  (-0.4)  (3.3)  (-1.6)  (2.6)
Grain  Corn  1.97  0.08  NA  0.59  -0.93  -0.24
(12.8)  (2.0)  (5.0)  (-4.3)  (-3.4)
Cotton  NAb  NEC  -0.20  NA  0.36  NA
(-  1.0)  (1.3)
Fruits & Nuts  -0.42  -0.55  0.32  -0.17  -0.79  NA
(-2.5)  (-14.7)  (3.3)  (-1.1)  (-2.9)
Pasture  -0.10  0.14  0.32  -0.05  0.80  0.25
(-  1.1)  (4.6)  (1.9)  (-0.8)  (6.3)  (5.3)
Rice  NA  1.13  NA  NA  NA  NA
(15.0)
Sugar Beets  -1.20  0.33  0.04  NA  NA  0.53
(-3.3)  (5.9)  (0.4)  (5.0)
Vegetables  0.21  0.07  0.27  0.09  -0.79  -1.09
(2.3)  (1.9)  (2.5)  (0.9)  (-5.6)  (-7.5)
Wheat  -0.01  -0.20  0.80  0.38  -0.28  0.05
(-0.2)  (-5.1)  (5.5)  (5.0)  (-1.6)  (0.7)
Fallow  -0.32  -0.08  -2.33  0.12  0.23  -0.10
(-2.5)  (-2.2)  (-12.7)  (1.1)  (1.3)  (-1.4)
ani  W
Note:  The water constraint elasticity is measured as  W  --  using the tobit model elasticity formula in Maddala.
a The numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics  for  the regression  coefficients  on  the water constraints  from  the land
allocation equations (On/dW).
b NA means that the crop either was not grown in the region or had too few observations  for successful estimation.
c  NE means that the equation was not estimated because the maximum likelihood procedure did not converge.
allocated to a crop given a one acre-foot increase in total available surface water. Accordingly, an additional
acre-foot of water  would change  land allocations to hay crops,  barley, and  sugar beets by .035,  -. 031,
and - .010 acres, respectively. In combination, the set of  water constraint coefficients measures the cropping
pattern response to a change in water availability.  The results indicate that relaxing the water constraint
would induce land reallocation from barley,  sugar beets, fruit and nut orchards,  and fallow land to hay
crops,  grain corn,  and vegetables.  The wheat and pasture  coefficients are  not statistically  different from
zero. The physical identity requires  that changes in land allocation sum to zero  since total land remains
unchanged.  The nine water constrain  wa  onst  t coefficients  in the region sum to .01.
The water  constraint  continues  to perform  strongly  as a determinant  of production  decisions in  the
other BuRec production regions. In total,  53 land allocation equations and 36 crop supply equations are
estimated. Of these, the water constraint is significant at the .05 level in 36 land allocation equations and
at the .01  level in 28 of those  36 (table  2). It is significant at the .05 level in 24 of the supply equations
and  at the .01  level in 20 of those  24.  The water  constraint's  performance  in the complete  set of land
allocation  and  crop supply  equations  underscores  the importance of water deliveries  to  irrigation  agri-
culture.
Water constraint elasticities measure the cropping pattern and supply response to a 1% increase in water
availability. They largely are inelastic:  47 of 53 elasticities  generated from the land allocation  equations
and 32 of 36 from the supply equations  are less than one in absolute value. Table 2 reports the elasticities
for the land allocation equations in all six BuRec regions.  The supply elasticities  generally  are similar to
the reported land allocation  elasticities. 1 4 Overall, the elasticities  suggest that minor reductions in water
supply would not produce dramatic adjustments in cropland use and crop supply. The Pacific Northwest
Region,  with  three land allocation  elasticities  and three  supply  elasticities  in  the elastic  range,  would
experience  the most significant adjustments.
While theory is silent about the signs on the water constraint coefficients, one perspective for interpreting
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Table 3.  Simulated Acreage  Response  to a 10% Water Supply Reduction
1987  BuRec Land Allocation  Simulated Acreage Response
Percent  Percent
of BuRec  Acreage  Crop  of BuRec
Irrigated Crop  Crop Acreage  Acresa  Response  Acreage  Acresa
Alfalfa & Hays  2,208,936  21.2  -49,028  2,159,907  20.7
Barley  514,188  4.9  22,878  537,066  5.1
Grain Corn  835,438  8.0  -409  835,029  8.0
Cotton  829,437  7.9  -2,896  826,541  7.9
Fruits & Nuts  1,020,699  9.8  45,156b  1,065,855  10.2
Pasture  821,067  7.9  -5,201  815,866  7.8
Rice  191,660  1.8  -21,658  170,002  1.6
Sugar  Beets  354,430  3.4  4,345  358,775  3.4
Vegetables  1,006,095  9.6  -8,209  997,886  9.6
Wheat  756,114  7.2  -5,920  750,194  7.2
Fallow  944,615  9.1  33,962  978,577  9.4
a Percentages  do not sum to 100 because acreage in miscellaneous crops is not included in the table. Total BuRec land
in irrigation  rotation was  10,435,165  acres in  1987.
b The simulated acreage  response for fruit and nut orchards represents  1.3%  of 1987  national harvested acreage  of the
crop. For the remaining crops, the acreage responses  comprise less than  1%  of national harvested acreage of the crop.
the  results  is  based  on  the  crops'  physical  water  requirements.  This  perspective  says  that producers
reallocate  land  from crops with  low water  requirements  to crops with  high water  requirements  as the
water  constraint relaxes.  Water-intensive  crops like alfalfa,  vegetables,  sugar beets,  orchards, and  grain
corn have  higher water requirements  than wheat, cotton,  and barley.15 Although the comparative  static
results in (6)-(9)  show the  importance of intercrop  interactions  in determining  the effect  of the water
constraint, a single-crop,  water-requirement  perspective  frequently guides  intuition.
6
The empirical results conform to the water-requirement  perspective  in some, but not all, regions. For
each crop, the elasticities and underlying  coefficients vary in sign and/or magnitude across regions (table
2), suggesting that producers in different regions face different multicrop profit functions.  The coefficients'
signs in the Pacific Northwest and Mid-Pacific Regions generally are consistent with the water requirement
perspective, while the signs in the Upper Colorado and Missouri Basin Regions generally are inconsistent.
Although crop-water requirements are clearly an important factor in determining land allocation decisions
when irrigation water is fixed,  they do not necessarily dictate the allocations at the margin.
The water constraint elasticities  should be considered  in light of three caveats concerning  model spec-
ification, data availability, and maintained hypotheses. First, the analysis shows that the water constraint
parameters  are sensitive  to the geographic  definition of the regions.  This  suggests that the slope of the
constraint depends on location-specific  physical characteristics.  Estimating  district-specific slopes  would
abstract from any location-specific  effects,  but district-specific  parameters  cannot be estimated without
longer  time-series  data.  The  coefficients  thus are  restricted  to be  equal across  districts  within  BuRec
production region boundaries.  Second, local patterns of crop rotation practices,  water supply variability,
land quality variability, BuRec operating  rules, weather risk, extension practices, and processing or mar-
keting infrastructure may constitute sources of omitted variable bias. Third, some farms with long growing
seasons double  crop their land,  and some farms have  access to groundwater  in addition to using  BuRec
water.  These  can be  interpreted  either  as  departures  from  maintained  hypotheses  or  as  a problem  of
measuring land allocation and the water constraint properly.
Policy  Simulation: A Reduction in BuRec  Water Availability
The estimated water constraint elasticities establish a basis for evaluating the impact of water conservation
policy  on  agricultural  production  from  BuRec-served  farms.  Using  the region-specific  land  allocation
elasticities  with  respect  to water  quantity  (table 2)  and  1987  data on  land allocation  in each  BuRec
production region,  we simulate the effect on a BuRec-wide  cropping pattern of a  10% reduction in 1987
water deliveries.  The  supply reduction  equals  2.55  million  acre-feet of surface water.  The results  show
the changes in individual crop acreage and in the percentage of total BuRec acres in each crop (table 3).
Because the experiment  reduces water  supply,  crops  wvith positive  elasticities  are  allocated fewer acres,
while crops with negative elasticities are allocated additional acres. In the Mid-Pacific Region, for example,
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orchard acreage increases  37,593 acres (from a base of 683,509) and rice acreage  decreases 21,658  acres
(from a base of 191,660) in response to the water-supply reduction.
The generally small elasticities and, for a given crop, the sign changes across regions combine to produce
uniformly low BuRec-wide acreage responses. Although the decline of 49,028 acres in hay crop production
is the largest absolute response, it is fairly small relative to its base acreage. In this case, increases of over
10,000 hay acres in the Upper Colorado and Missouri Basin Regions  dampen the negative BuRec-wide
response. The largest increase in acreage,  45,156  acres, occurs with fruit and nut orchards. 1 7
The simulation contains an interesting policy implication concerning the appropriate policy framework
for evaluating  BuRec water conservation  decisions: Is the BuRec important to both federal water policy
and national agricultural  policy in terms of allocative efficiency and welfare effects?  The BuRec's control
of between  40% and  85%  of the  annual  flow  of several  major western  rivers  establishes  the agency's
importance to federal water policy. 1 8 Previous research already demonstrates that reallocating water from
agriculture  to urban, recreational,  hydropower,  and freshwater fishery purposes  would create  significant
welfare  improvements (Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw; Howitt, Mann, and Vaux;  Wahl). Simultaneously,
the BuRec services one-fourth of western irrigated agriculture, and western irrigated agriculture accounts
for over one-fourth  of the market value of national crop production. BuRec operations potentially could
affect market  prices of up to  ten major crops.  The possibility of welfare  effects  in commodity markets
must be considered for a full accounting of the economic consequences  of BuRec decisions.
Although previous research does not provide detailed numerical information  on the necessary reallo-
cation of BuRec water supplies to achieve allocative efficiency, the simulation's 10% reduction in irrigation
water  supply provides  a useful  setting  for assessing  commodity market  impacts. Acreage  responses  of
fruits and nuts, rice, and vegetables  are  sufficiently large relative to national harvested acreage  to affect
market  prices.  (The accounting  must be in terms of acreage  rather  than  output because,  as mentioned
earlier, crop supply  equations cannot be estimated for fruits, nuts, and vegetables.  To relate  acreage to
output, we assume that acreage response  equals  supply response in percentage  terms.) As percentages  of
national harvested  acreage in the crops, the responses  are  a  1.31%  increase  for fruits and nuts, a .93%
decrease  for rice, and a .34% decrease  for vegetables.  The price elasticity of demand for fruits, nuts, and
vegetables  is -. 4 (Dunn and Heien) and for rice is  -. 2 (Lin).1 9 With the inelastic price elasticities, the
acreage responses  translate into proportionately larger price effects: The price of fruit and nuts decreases
3.3%, the price of rice increases 4.6%, and the price of vegetables increases  .8%. Thus, by affecting market
prices of three important commodities,  a  10%  reduction  in BuRec irrigation water  supply  would affect
the welfare of consumers and producers who otherwise are not related directly to BuRec water allocation.20
Summary
This  article analyzes  irrigated  agricultural production  on farms  served  surface water  by  the Bureau  of
Reclamation.  The  institutional environment  of western water  implies that entitlements  to reclamation
water deliveries  should be treated as a fixed input, that is, as an input allocated by contractual quantity
rather than market price. Irrigated production, further, largely occurs as a multicrop enterprise. To capture
these traits, we develop a multioutput model of the agricultural firm with surface water and land as fixed,
allocatable  inputs.  By  modeling the institutional  environment of the multioutput irrigated agricultural
firm, the theoretical results, empirical application, and policy simulation produce a cohesive microeconom-
ic analysis of BuRec water  supply and conservation.
The empirical evidence-based  on estimated equations of up to ten irrigated crops for each of the six
BuRec production regions-demonstrates  that the surface water constraint performs  strongly as a deter-
minant of crop supply and land allocation decisions.
Although BuRec water resource development for irrigation agriculture provided a foundation for western
settlement, intersectoral competition for water has triggered a decline in agricultural water use and irrigated
acreage  that will continue for the foreseeable future.  Reducing BuRec irrigation  water deliveries,  either
by voluntary water transfers or mandatory conservation measures, offers one method of achieving Pareto
improvements  in western water allocation.  The article  shows,  however,  that price effects  in commodity
markets may accompany  BuRec  water  supply reductions.  A simulated  10%  reduction  in water  supply
generates price changes ranging from .8%  to 4.6% for three major crops. Thus, a comprehensive economic
analysis of BuRec water supply policy should consider welfare  effects in commodity markets in addition
to the allocative  efficiency of surface water resources.
[Received July 1991;  final revision received November 1991.]
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Notes
1 Irrigation  districts operate as quasi-public  organizations  that are managed  by a board of directors elected by the
retail customers (Leshy).  The organizational structure of the  at  stredistricts-operated as nonprofit enterprises with state laws
nebulously  defining  their general  public  responsibilities-contributes  to  the  institutional  rigidities of surface  water
allocation.
2 The administrative procedures  result in BuRec water prices set below long-run marginal cost of water supply. Two
generations of economists have noted the allocative inefficiency of this pricing structure. These include early research
contained  in the classic volumes  by Bain,  Caves,  and Margolis;  Eckstein;  Hirshleifer,  DeHaven,  and Milliman;  and
Krutilla and Eckstein.
3 Kanazawa presents econometric evidence to establish the point convincingly that BuRec supplies provide a binding
constraint on behavior while BuRec water prices  are statistically insignificant in explaining  behavior.
4 Crop-specific profit functions can be defined by assuming technical nonjointness. This makes tractable the derivation
of explicit water allocation and  land allocation functions using a flexible  functional  form  for the crop-specific  profit
functions. Equations (1H)5)  and (11)-(12) will make this clear. The technical nonjointness assumption is not required
to derive output supply and farm-level  input demand functions using standard duality results.
5 H = (ad22/dwi)(d2aldn)  + (d2ir2/Owj)(d2 r2/dn2)  + (d2krl/dw)(d2 r 1/dn 2)
+ (d2rldw/w)(d2r 2/On2)  - 2(d27rl/dwldnl)(d 27r 2/0w 20n 2) - (d2rWr/wldnl)(d 2 srl/wW0n,1)
- (d2r 2/dwOdwn 2 )(d
27r2/dw 2dn2)
6 The absence of concavity, however, is not the source of the indeterminate comparative static results. The ambiguity
is preserved even when  we impose two additional restrictions on the profit functions, both of which represent plausible
characterizations of agricultural production. First, strict concavity of the functions imposes negative second derivatives.
Second, complementarity of the water and land inputs imposes positive cross-partial derivatives (d 27rl/dw0dn, and Od27r 2/
dw2dn2). Imposing these restrictions does not eliminate the ambiguity of the comparative static results because the land
and water  allocations interact through  the cross-partial  derivatives.  If the  allocations were  independent  rather  than
complementary  (i.e., if the cross-partials equalled zero),  land allocations would be independent of the water constraint
and, assuming concavity, water allocations would be increasing in the water constraint. Without imposing independence,
though,  theory continues to generate no testable hypotheses.
7 The land constraint  identity in (10)  implies that one of the land allocations in  (6) and  (7) will decrease  with an
increase in the water constraint (unless both equations equal zero). Imposing concavity and water-land complementarity,
dn*/  W  < 0  occurs when  profitable  opportunities  exist for  land reallocations  from crop  1 to crop  2. This tends  to
occur when: (a) the cross-input marginal profitability of allocating land to crop 2 is larger than that for crop  1, and (b)
the marginal profitability of crop 1 is declining rapidly relative  to crop 2's rate  of decline.
8 It also holds that, unlike conventional factor  demand functions, the allocation equations in (11)  and (12)  do not
contain  symmetric  cross-price effects.  The logical  candidate for  symmetry,  by analogy, would be dwi/N = dn,/oW.
With two fixed, allocatable inputs, no symmetry  conditions hold.
9Inserting equation (11)  for w*  into equation (14)  is essential for the empirical section because data on crop-specific
water allocations are not observed. It follows, then, that n* also should be replaced by equation (12) to obtain a set of
reduced-form  supply equations.
10  In addition to water allocation equations not being estimated because of data limitations, they cannot be identified
from parameter estimates of the land allocation and supply equations.
1I We tried to test for heteroskedasticity  by assuming that the error variances are a linear function of the number of
farms in the district. Simultaneous  estimation of the tobit coefficients and the heteroskedasticity  model in a manner
described  by Maddala (p.  180)  failed to converge.
12 The entire set of crop supply and land allocation equations,  estimated by crop and by BuRec production region,
are available from the authors upon request.
13 The stochastic  model underlying tobit analysis specifies the relationship between the independent  variables  and
the latent dependent variable (i.e., the desired level of the dependent variable). We observe the latent dependent variable
only  when it exceeds  a threshold  level. Thus, coefficients obtained  using tobit measure  the effect  of the explanatory
variables  on the unobserved  latent variable. Multiplying  by the probability of the dependent variable  exceeding  the
threshold transforms  the coefficients to reflect changes  in the observed dependent variable.
14 The land allocation  and  supply equations for hay crops are an exception because,  in three regions, the  signs on
the  water constraints reverse  between the allocation  and the supply  equations.  In the  Mid-Pacific,  the sign changes
from a positive coefficient  in the land allocation to a negative coefficient in the supply. The reverse occurs in the Upper
Colorado and Missouri  Basin. Differences  between the supply and land allocation coefficients may be  attributable to
changes in crop yield, as hay crops provide flexibility in irrigations and cuttings. 1 5The ranking in terms of water requirements  is based on predicted water application rates from crop-specific water
demand equations (Negri and Brooks). The equations include output and input prices, irrigation technology, topography,
and  soil and  climate characteristics  as independent  variables. Predicting  water application rates  at the  mean of the
independent  variables  produces an approximate ranking as if all crops faced identical exogenous  conditions.
16 Research applying the water-requirement perspective to a multicrop farm with limited water supplies was conducted
using a mathematical programming  model (Bernardo et al.).
17 The simulation  results should be  interpreted in  light of three qualifications.  One, the  elasticities apply  only to
marginal changes, while a  10% reduction in water supply is nonmarginal. Two, the model holds land constant. In the
long  run,  reducing water  supply likely  would  cause  a reduction in  the total  land in  irrigation  rotation. And three,
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opportunities to shift to dryland production or to groundwater supply could reduce the production impacts of BuRec
water-supply reductions.
18 The rivers  controlled by the BuRec include  the Colorado,  Snake, and Rio Grande  and, in years of low flow,  the
Sacramento  and San Joaquin.
19 The rice elasticity applies to the domestic market even  though rice is exported  from the United States.  The price
elasticity of export demand is ignored because rice exports occur largely as a result of federal  export subsidies  created
in the Food Security Act of 1985.
20 Of course, the BuRec-wide responses mask the importance of the disaggregated,  regional impacts of reduced water
deliveries  because many regional responses offset each other. Rural economies in many areas of the West rely heavily
on farm operations receiving BuRec water. These considerations also weigh heavily in deliberations over BuRec water
allocation  policy.
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Appendix
Data  for land  allocation  and  crop  supply come  from  "Crop Production  and Water Utilization Data,"  an annual
survey of irrigation districts served by the BuRec. The data, aggregated to the project level, are summarized in Summary
Statistics,  Vol.  I:  Water, Land, and Related Data, an annual  BuRec  publication.  The  population  of 620 irrigation
districts is not used in the current analysis  because of missing data problems. The number of observations  per BuRec
region are:  Pacific Northwest,  946; Mid-Pacific,  1,306; Lower  Colorado,  191; Upper Colorado,  414;  Southwest,  146;
and Missouri Basin,  504.
The land constraint measures total land that can be irrigated with existing irrigation infrastructure.  It is recorded as
"total  area in irrigation rotation"  on the  survey.  Crop-specific  land allocation  and  supply (the dependent variables)
also are taken directly  from the survey tape.
The water constraint  measures  the total water  delivered by the irrigation district to farms. It includes both BuRec
project water and non-BuRec water obtained by the district and excludes operational spills, transportation losses, and
non-agricultural  deliveries  made by the district. The data do not distinguish which districts contain farms that pump
groundwater.
Expected output prices  and variable input prices are relative prices normalized  by the wheat price [U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), National Agricultural Statistics Service;  U.S. Department of Energy; Edison Electric Institute].
With the exception of vegetable price, all output market prices and variable input prices are state-level data. Vegetable
price  is a national index  of vegetable prices. For crops covered by federal commodity programs,  the price variable  is
the higher of one-year lagged market price or weighted support price (Houck and Ryan). For the remaining crops,  the
price  variable is one-year lagged market price.
Climatological data are derived from the magnetic tape, "Climatography  of the U.S., No. 20,"  a monthly summary
of climatological observations from the NOAA cooperative network (U.S. Department of Commerce,  National Climatic
Data  Center).  Matching each  county with the nearest cooperative  weather station generates  county-specific  climate.
Climate data pertaining  to irrigation districts are computed  as a weighted  average of county-level  data since  districts
often span more than one  county. The weights are the irrigation district acres within the counties.
The estimated  equations  include two variables that proxy for evapotranspiration.  Since  climate, not weather,  de-
termines  land allocation,  the variables represent climate  conditions for the growing season. Annual weather conditions
that influence crop yields are not included in the estimation. The climate variables  are: (a) cumulative effective rainfall
(in inches)  for the growing season, and (b) cumulative growing degree days (GDD) for the growing season, using a base
of 60  degrees. Effective rainfall measures  the fraction  of monthly rainfall that contributes to plant growth (Blaney and
Criddle). The mean daily temperature minus 60 degrees, if the mean exceeds  60, or zero otherwise, defines the number
of GDD for each day. Expected GDD and effective rainfall are accumulated  over the growing season.
Because  the growing  season varies  by  climatic  region,  the  monthly  values  of the  climatic  variables  accumulate
between January and September when the following conditions are satisfied.  If  the average minimum daily temperature
never falls below freezing  for the entire month,  then  the climate variables  accumulate  the full  value of the monthly
observations.  If the  average minimum  daily  temperature  falls below  freezing  between one and  five times,  then  the
variables accumulate  only half the monthly values, as if the season began or ended in mid-month. Months with more
than five  freezes are  excluded completely from the growing season.
Topography,  soil productivity, and soil texture variables  are taken from the "National Resources Inventory"  (NRI)
(USDA, Soil Conservation  Service  1982),  which contains  county-level  data.  For each  county,  the NRI  sampled the
physical characteristics  of all non-federal  rural land at several  randomly selected points. Within county observations,
soil  texture,  soil  slope,  and land capability  class  are quantified  and  averaged.  The  average  includes  only  cropland
observations.  Like the climate variables,  soil and land characteristics  pertaining to the district are  a weighted  average
of county-level data for the counties  spanned by the district.
County observations of soil texture are classified  on a five-point  scale, where  1 =  sand, 2 = sandy loam,  3 = loam,
4 = clay loam, and 5 = clay. The numerical averages  for the counties are classified into three dummy variables:  sandy
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soil (texture  <  2.3),  loamy soil  (2.3  < texture  <  3.6),  and clayey  soil  (texture  >  3.6).  The sand  and  clay dummy
variables capture the soil-texture  effect relative to loam.
The land capability classification system used in the NRI classifies soils based on their ability to produce commonly
cultivated crops  (USDA, Soil Conservation  Service  1973).  Land capability  classes,  identified  1 through  8,  indicate
progressively more limitations  that restrict agricultural land use.  For example,  soils that are  erosive,  saline, shallow,
stony, or wet limit land productivity.  County  observations  on  land capability  are averaged  and  then classified  into
dummy variables  following  a procedure  similar to the soil  texture dummies. Land capability classifications  less than
2.5  defined  high  productivity  soils,  while  classifications  greater  than 3.5  defined  low productivity  soils.  Finally,  a
topography variable, soil  slope, measures the average  cropland slope (in percentage)  for the county.